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MORAL PRACTICES: ASSIGNING 
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
 
JOSEPH HOOVER* 
 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 Who has the authority to assign responsibility for international crimes? There 
is a simple answer: international tribunals, in particular the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Yet this obvious response obscures further questions regarding where 
the political authority to create international tribunals comes from, as well as the vital 
moral question regarding how courts are constituted as actors with the capacity to 
assign blame. In modern international politics, authority has traditionally rested with 
states, meaning that rightful legal institutions were created by states and justified by 
their consent.1 The ICC is granted authority in this way, because it was created 
through a treaty negotiated and signed by states.2 Such a procedural response, 
however, obscures as much as it reveals about the politics and morality of assigning 
responsibility for international crimes. Asking how a new international authority is 
constituted and justified as an actor with the political power to try state officials and 
other international criminals—and to thereby embody and defend supposedly 
emergent norms of global justice—is a more contentious, difficult question that takes 
us beyond questions of positive law. 
 In international law, there is also an account of the law’s authority based on 
the moral claims it makes, which are intended to shape states and constrain their 
power.3 The ICC belongs to this tradition as well. The fundamental issue I want to 
explore in this article is how such moral authority is constituted in real world 
institutions, particularly the authority to assign responsibility for international crimes. 
This is a vital issue to consider if we want to understand the ICC, its limits, and its 
place in the changing world of contemporary international politics. From the 
beginning the idea of an international criminal court was framed in legalistic terms, in 
both its founding and practical activities to date.4 Now that the ICC is in operation it 
actively claims authority through its defense of universal moral principles and pursuit 
of justice for victims of violence. On this basis, authority is granted to the institution 
because it embodies universal moral norms, which in turn constrain the actions of 
states, leading to the reform of international politics.5 Supporters of the ICC 
characterize the court as a victory of law over politics, and of morality over the self-
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interests of states.6 This account of the ICC’s authority leaves us with important 
issues to consider: How was such a victory for international law possible? What are 
the court’s prospects for continued success? Should we accept the claim that the ICC 
is a legal rather than political institution?7 
International courts are products of their time and place, created through 
political compromise, responsive to particular crises, and dedicated to the interests of 
particular actors.8 Despite rhetoric that insists that the ICC and other international 
tribunals are (or should be) legal rather than political institutions,9 a focus on the 
constitution of these courts reveals the way preexisting social practices and power 
hierarchies structure their work. Placing the ICC’s authority to assign responsibility in 
its social and political context complicates our understanding of such authority and 
enables important lines of criticism. I argue that rather than overcoming the politics of 
their creation, legal institutions are indelibly shaped by them, and rather than escaping 
politics, legal institutions like the ICC transpose politics into a legal register.10 These 
claims do not make the attribution of responsibility impossible but they do push us to 
consider the moral authority to make such attributions differently. The conventional 
account of moral authority is seen as the just application of rightful law, although the 
realities of politics may make the ideal exercise of that authority difficult. 11 The goal, 
nonetheless, is to make the law as impartial and judicious as possible to ensure its 
separation from politics. An alternative way of understanding moral and legal 
authority is to acknowledge its political element, in the sense that the authority 
exercised is always the product of a decision to impose values upon others, which 
always remains a kind of violence because those decisions are never universally or 
finally justifiable, but rather are in some measure politically driven.12 
 If we understand the capacity to assign moral responsibility as part of a social 
practice, it is vital to understand the background conditions that partly determine who 
can assume the privilege of assigning responsibility, while also considering the effects 
those privileged actors have as they exercise their authority. Understanding the 
assignation of responsibility as a social practice requires us to identify the social 
relationships through which a particular individual or institution gains the capacity to 
assign responsibility to culpable agents who are then subject to punishment. Taking 
this approach allows us to begin addressing the difficulty Jens Meierhenrich identifies 
in “attempting to disaggregate the first permanent international criminal court by 
scrutinizing various socially meaningful or otherwise significant aspects of its 
everyday life.”13 In international politics, the historically dominant practice has been 
one of “victor’s justice,” in which the authority of legal bodies and the punishments 
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they hand down is given by the force of arms possessed by the victorious state.14 This 
practice has always provoked opposition and for advocates of international criminal 
law the ICC represents a milestone in the long evolution from “victor’s justice” to 
true international justice, in which the rule of law rather than the rule of power 
becomes the basis for international politics.15 “The ICC reminds governments that 
realpolitik, which sacrifices justice at the altar of political settlements, is no longer 
accepted.”16 International criminal law seeks to reconstruct this practice of assigning 
responsibility by moving towards the effective rule of law and creating new moral 
actors, most vitally an independent international court. In this article I argue that the 
shift in the social practice of assigning responsibility that is sought through the ICC 
contains within it an impossible renunciation of politics.  
This shift in practice is explored by looking at the creation of the ICC. Using the 
history of the founding of this landmark institution I trace its limits, the power 
hierarchies that structure it as an actor capable of assigning responsibility, and its 
importance for the development of practices of international criminal law. The 
conclusion of this analysis is that the ICC, as a moral agent, is limited by its inability 
to acknowledge its own political power, as its authority is premised on the separation 
of law and politics. As former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo described his 
role,  
 
I shall not be involved in political considerations. . . . It is the only way to 
build a judicial institution, to help the political actors to perceive the legal 
limits. To facilitate the work and planning of political actors, I inform 
them in advance of my next steps, and ensure that my Office be 
transparent and predictable. However, my duty is to apply the law 
without political considerations. Other actors have to adjust to the law.17  
 
This limitation in turn presents significant obstacles for the ICC’s goal of ending 
impunity and raises questions about the promise of international justice for those most 
directly affected by the conflicts where the ICC is involved. These negative 
consequences are seen in the court’s actions in Uganda, where its first arrest warrants 
were issued.18 
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The ICC’s claim to authority rests on the renunciation of politics in favor of 
the power of the law, which is justified by the law’s moral quality. International 
criminal law’s moral quality is characterized by two distinct ends: First, the 
elimination of impunity for individuals with state position and power, which extends 
the rule of law to the international level, and second, responding to the suffering of 
victims of atrocity and war by bringing those responsible to justice, through 
punishment.19 These aims are intended to ensure the just application of universal 
moral principles. In the discussions and official drafting documents that led to the 
creation of the ICC, this moral authority was emphasized while political authority, 
associated with partiality, compromise, and impunity was rejected.20 The difficulty 
this creates, and that is revealed when we think about moral responsibility as a social 
practice, is that moral authority is always tied up with other forms of social authority 
that must make use of coercion and compromise, and is unavoidably partial. In 
practice the ICC must be a political actor, but the way that its moral authority is 
constructed leads to a kind of schizophrenia. Even in the terms set out by the ICC’s 
own ideals for moral actors, the ICC is in practice inconsistent and contradictory. This 
can be seen in the Uganda case, where the ICC had strong pragmatic reasons for 
choosing to pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as a first prosecution and to 
seek close cooperation with the Ugandan government. These political choices raise 
doubts about the ICC’s impartiality and capacity to serve the ends of international 
justice.21 Although the authority of the ICC is articulated through the renunciation of 
politics, its exercise of authority is quintessentially political. The court not only was 
constituted by states and through a process of compromise and negotiation that has 
shaped it as an institution22 but also exercises its legal authority to make choices on 
matters beyond the law: who to prosecute, how conflicts are represented, and when to 
compromise to secure the cooperation of states.23 In the end, I want to claim that 
attending to how the ICC assigns responsibility in terms of social practice should lead 
us to reconsider the law–politics relationship sought by international criminal law. 
The agonistic character of international criminal law should be acknowledged. This 
agonistic character suggests that the law never escapes politics and that failing to 
embrace the political role of the ICC is damaging to this important institution, as 
disavowing politics lends itself to naivety and a lack of self-criticism. 
There are a number of difficulties with the claims I am making here: First, 
how does the ICC act as a moral agent? Second, how can I justify the claim that it is 
acting in the way I claim? Third, how can I show that the cause of the court’s action 
has to do with how the ICC is constructed as a moral agent? The truth is I cannot 
respond fully to these difficulties. In the first case, speaking of the ICC as a moral 
agent is necessarily a shorthand for speaking of the acts of individuals that take place 
within the ICC as an institution. In most instances, I am talking about the prosecutor 
at the time in question, Luis Moreno Ocampo, but this too is a simplification, given 
that those with whom he conferred surely shaped his actions and decisions. A further 
issue is that there is no record of his thoughts and actions, much less those of who he 
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worked with—the evidence available is very limited. Finally, with respect to the third 
difficulty, I am not claiming that the way the ICC was constructed as a moral agent is 
determinant, that it is a structural force bearing down on all those involved, but rather 
that the initial act of construction shapes and constrains the practice of the court and is 
important so far as we see the court’s claim to authority made in terms of a rejection 
of politics. This self-understanding means that the ICC struggles to be clear or open 
about its politics in its public pronouncements, and one suspects even internally, 
though this is hard to judge because of the lack of evidence. So, the argument 
presented here is not based in a deep and long term empirical engagement with the 
court as an institution simply because such work has not yet been done, though it is 
increasingly seen as important and being attempted.24 Rather, my claims are based on 
available textual evidence and a kind of conceptual analysis of the moral ideals that 
shape the court. In light of these limitations, my conclusions are suggestive rather 
than determinate. 
 
II 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE 
The link between morality and law is hardly simple or straightforward. There 
are those who see the law as grounded in effective political authority and its 
institutional execution, and for them moral claims are only ideological justifications 
of authority; morality does not have its own power.25 International criminal law starts 
from the opposing side of this claim. Its fundamental justification is that there are 
some wrongs that are undeniable and, in turn, norms that should be applicable 
everywhere.26 Assuming this link between morality and law, in which moral principle 
provides justification for the social power that the law exercises, the question of 
assigning moral responsibility becomes central.  
Moral theory, however, does not provide any one compelling understanding of 
responsibility. The question moral philosophy commonly confronts is whether 
individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions?27 The typically modern 
response is that they can so long as they acted freely and were capable of knowing the 
morally right action.28 These presumptions are echoed in legal norms, such as actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea  (the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty). This 
account of responsibility, in which moral culpability is constructed from causal 
responsibility and blameworthiness, treats responsibility as a quality of an individual 
actor. Philosophers have found two fundamental problems with this account. First, it 
depends on the reality of free will, as the responsible actor must be the cause of her 
own actions.29 Second, it depends upon the universality of moral principles, which 
must be known to any right-minded individual.30 Both of these assumptions have 
proven problematic.  
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There is not space here to go into the philosophical debates on moral 
responsibility, but neither is there any need to do so, because an identifiable 
compatibilist compromise position has come to dominate.31 This compromise 
suggests that although individuals’ actions are in many ways determined by forces 
outside their control, individuals nonetheless maintain some capacity to direct their 
actions and choices. Further, whether we see moral norms as rational or conventional, 
there is an assumption that an individual can be expected to know and respect some 
moral norms, meaning that the assignation of responsibility is possible. What this 
compromise fails to account for is that assigning responsibility becomes a political act 
once we no longer see it as a discovery of a fact about the world. Rejecting the 
responsibility-as-fact concept is especially important for the compatibilist position, 
because that position acknowledges that both free will and moral principles are at 
least partly social constructions, in which someone exercises power over someone 
else. Yet, because this compromise position remains committed to the idea of 
responsibility as a quality that individuals possess, it is not clear where or how the 
political aspects of responsibility can be considered.  
It is for this reason that some scholars have moved to think of moral 
responsibility in different terms, namely as a social practice.32 This move is based in 
the idea that when we hold each other responsible we are not really concerned with 
larger philosophical questions of free will and rational morality, but with influencing 
the actions of others (and ourselves). Understanding responsibility as a social practice 
allows us to see how the act of holding each other accountable to social norms is 
rooted in particular contexts and always involves the exercise of power. The 
difficulties of dominant accounts of responsibility are only exacerbated when we 
consider international crimes involving collective actors and the mobilization of 
social groups.33 Therefore, it is this understanding of moral responsibility as a social 
practice that I want to use in thinking about the ICC and how it is able to claim the 
authority to hold individuals accountable. In arguing for a social practice account of 
responsibility I share the concern for moving beyond the impasse between theoretical 
abstraction and naïve empiricism that Meierhenrich expresses in his introduction to 
this issue, but I also stand slightly to the side of his central aim as my analysis 
remains explicitly normative.34  
In previous work, I have argued for an understanding of moral responsibility 
as a social practice rooted in John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy.35 The key points I 
want to bring out here are twofold. First, when we think of responsibility as a social 
practice the question of whether individuals possess free will, and therefore can be 
causally responsible for an act, is transformed into the question of whether individuals 
are enabled to be reflective in their actions and if social conditions grant them the 
capacity to act purposefully. Second, thinking of responsibility as a social practice 
shifts our attention away from the question of whether a moral norm is universally 
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binding as such and towards the question of the quality and consequences of the 
moral ends we pursue. Assigning responsibility, then, is the social practice of holding 
individuals to their proclaimed ends. Once we adopt this view, the task of morality is 
not to find agents who can be held responsible or determine the norms to which they 
must be accountable, but to consider the quality of our social practices and the 
consequence of the ends we pursue.  
A social-practice approach to responsibility brings the political elements of 
assigning blame and holding accountable to the fore, and a number of scholars have 
considered the distinctive difficulty of finding culpable agents when we are concerned 
with addressing “international” crimes. The account of responsibility that sees moral 
culpability as a quality that adheres to individuals cannot adequately address the 
reality of mass crimes in which whole populations can be seen as more or less 
culpable.36 For example, although soldiers may be responsible for particular atrocities, 
their actions are enabled by other collective actors, such as military leaders, state 
representatives and democratic publics, who are thus in a way responsible as well.37 
These moves to reconsider responsibility in world politics in terms of social practice 
are important, but they also understate the role of power in constituting culpable 
actors through the practices of international criminal law. Put another way, the focus 
on volitional individuals who commit heinous crimes is not only a conceptual 
mistake, but it also makes it all too easy to ignore structural causes of mass violence 
and the role that powerful international actors have in instigating and prolonging 
conflicts.38 
Paying attention to the construction of culpable agents, however, reveals only 
half of emerging practices of international responsibility. The actor who is able to 
assign responsibility, and in turn empowered to construct and limit which causes of 
conflict are to be addressed, is also socially constructed and defined by existing 
conditions and power hierarchies. So, whereas in previous work I have argued that 
accepting the idea of individual culpability in the practice of prosecuting international 
crimes obscures the social conditions that enable conflict and preserves the power 
inequalities that limit what the pursuit of international justice can achieve, in this 
article I focus on how the authority to hold responsible is constructed. To begin this 
work two things are needed: First, an account of what practices we are concerned with 
and second, an understanding of what is meant by a social practice. 
The first concern is answered by looking to the emerging practices of 
international criminal law and the way that international courts are constituted. Courts 
deliver judgments of culpability based on the assignment of responsibility made by 
prosecutors. So, the moral question is, how are they justified? What gives legal 
institutions the authority to hold us responsible? These questions are answered in 
many different ways by competing accounts of the law, but my focus will be on the 
way the authority of international courts is justified in their founding documents and 
practices of prosecution. In this instance I am looking at the ICC as a landmark 
institution in the development of international criminal law because it is the first 
permanent international criminal court and as such its authority had to be explicitly 
justified at the time of its creation, and continues to be justified in practice. The work 
done here is only an initial opening, as digging into the full complexity of the practice 
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of holding responsible at the ICC would require more extensive fieldwork. While my 
analysis here falls short of Meierhenrich’s injunction to move from desk based 
research to field research, it does provide a framework for how scholars interested in 
distinctly moral practice might begin such work.39 How I judge the ICC requires more 
explanation, which is why I now turn to the question of how analyzing responsibility 
in terms of social practice enables us to evaluate the moral quality of our practices. 
In looking at responsibility as a social practice I draw on Dewey’s ethical 
thinking. Although Dewey did not use the language of practice in his ethics, he did set 
out a theory of ethics that was practical and social. Dewey suggested that the work of 
ethics begins with an understanding of how norms function socially and how ethical 
ideals are practically viewed within a society.40 Dewey’s notion of responsibility is 
focused on the importance of holding individuals accountable to social norms, while 
also encouraging moral reflection on both the means by which this work is done and 
the ethical ends society pursues.41 In this way, we can see Dewey as offering an 
account of responsibility as a social practice. An important part of the practice of 
responsibility is the institutional context in which society holds individuals 
responsible, notably considering who is able to hold others accountable and how such 
authority is granted and its social consequences. I want to suggest that we can use 
Dewey’s ethical theory to develop a practical method for analyzing the value of the 
ICC as an institution with the authority to assign responsibility.  
Dewey’s method of ethical intelligence begins with identifying a problematic 
situation, looking for the practical concern to which ethical and political action 
responds.42 In the case of the ICC we can consider both the perceived need for such a 
court, which is a central part of its justification, as well as the problems generated by 
the court’s actions. The ICC was created as a response to the commission of atrocities 
worldwide, and particularly as a way to end the impunity many perpetrators of 
atrocity enjoyed. Criticism of the court has focused on whether it has been able to 
effectively achieve its ends and whether it is sufficiently attentive to the victims of 
atrocity.43 To evaluate the court and the criticisms leveled against it, we can follow 
Dewey’s general approach.  
First, consideration should be given to the context in which the ICC was set 
up, including its aims and means, as well as the social and political dynamic in which 
the court was created. This analysis also includes a consideration of historical context, 
considering how the ICC responds to and embodies existing practices. Second, this 
analysis should look to how well the professed aims of the court are met by the 
prescribed means, giving special attention to unexpected consequences. This 
reflection is important for tracing the width of the gap that can open up between the 
aims of an institution and the consequences of its practical action. Importantly, this 
gap can appear even in cases where the aims and means are pursued sincerely and 
effectively, because practical action to address a problem, like international impunity, 
can alter our overall evaluation of the aims towards which a particular moral practice 
is oriented. After a reflective analysis of the practice of the court, a Deweyan 
approach asks us to evaluate the institution and practice in question, in terms of 
whether it achieves its ends and the consequences of its activities. This process of 
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valuation is always done with more general moral values in mind and should focus on 
the wider consequence of a particular institution or practice. In this case, does the ICC 
make world politics more just or peaceful by some measure, and how does it affect 
the social and political relationships between the actors involved? In my own analysis 
I focus on whether the ICC is an authority that enables effective responses to atrocity 
and to what extent it engenders greater equality and control for those who suffer those 
atrocities. Finally, a valuation of the ICC provides a basis to suggest further 
reconstruction and, most importantly, further practical action to improve upon the 
failings of the court. In evaluating the ICC as an institution with the authority to 
assign responsibility, I consider both the founding of the court and its first arrest 
warrants, applying a pragmatic method of analysis to both grasp the practices of 
responsibility that the court is a part of, and to consider its achievements and 
limitations. 
 
III 
THE CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The creation of the ICC was something of a surprise. Supporters of the idea of 
a permanent international criminal court had struggled for years to generate interest 
and support for such a court.44 It is clear that in historical perspective the ICC is a 
response to the need to address the impunity of those who commit atrocities and an 
important component of an international legal system that protects universal human 
rights and seeks justice for the victims of atrocity. 45 What is less clear is why in 1998 
the ICC was seen as a necessary institution, even among states whose sovereign 
authority would be undermined by the court. There is a simple and comforting story 
that could be told about the advance of international law and human rights norms in 
the post-Cold War era, but this would obscure more than it illuminates. Rather, I want 
to suggest there were a number of different actors who were supportive of the court, 
and each for rather different reasons.  
First, there were individual advocates for an international criminal court 
(academics, lawyers, politicians, and activists) who were able to put the idea back on 
the agenda at the UN and proved instrumental in garnering support from states and 
global civil society. Second, the UN itself, particularly the International Law 
Commission (ILC) and the General Assembly (GA), was supportive of the idea of a 
permanent court that could not only bring enforcement powers to bear in defense of 
the international legal norms, but could also relieve some of the strain that the 
organization faced in trying to respond to atrocities in an ad hoc manner. Third, an 
increasing number of states were sympathetic to the idea, both to develop 
humanitarian and human rights law, and to defer some of the responsibility and cost 
of responding to atrocities to an international institution. Finally, global civil society, 
particularly the coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that became 
known as the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), was able to 
mobilize wider sentiment in favor of the court and advocate for its necessity as an 
institution that could alter international politics by enforcing international law in 
service of moral ends. The diversity of reasons why the court was seen as a necessary 
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project is important because even while the synergy of interests helped bring it to 
realization, the divergence in how the court was envisioned reveals how the ICC 
embodies competing projects and was defined from the beginning by political 
calculations. 
Trinidad’s Prime Minister Arthur Robinson, along with Robert Woetzel, Ben 
Ferencz, and Cherif Bassiouni, initiated the GA request for a draft statute for a 
permanent international criminal court from the ILC.46 Originally, the proposal was 
framed as a way of dealing with the specific crime of drug trafficking, but those 
involved ensured that the wording was left broad, so that other crimes could 
eventually be included.47 The passage of the resolution was, however, hardly a 
guarantee that anything substantive would come out of the discussions with the ILC. 
Bassiouni was particularly influential in the process, setting up an informal group of 
experts that provided its own draft statute,48 stepping in as chairman of the ILC after 
the first chairman quit, and securing outside resources for the project.49 Creating a 
permanent international court was a lifelong goal for Bassiouni and he did much 
intellectual and practical work to make it a reality.50 Looking at the importance of 
individuals reveals that, although the ICC is by no means the work of one man, it is 
nonetheless a highly idealistic institution supported by the conviction of particular 
individuals as much as it is by states or a wider community concerned with the 
development of international criminal law.51  
Other important individuals include Adriaan Bos,52 who chaired the 
Preparatory Committee meetings that laid the groundwork for the Rome conference, 
and Philippe Kirsch, who was the chairman at the Rome conference.53 In both cases, 
the individual commitment and political skill of these men ensured that the creation of 
the court was not delayed nor undermined by powerful state interests. They were vital 
to maintaining the momentum of the drafting as it went from being yet another 
proposal at the ILC to a treaty approved at the Rome conference. William Pace, who 
led the CICC, was another individual who shaped the drafting process and the 
constitution of the ICC. He was essential in engaging global civil society actors and 
coordinating their contributions, which included providing technical assistance to 
states, mobilizing public sympathy, and galvanizing support from a broad spectrum of 
NGOs.54 This shows how the court was partly a response to a problem perceived more 
by individuals than international institutions, states, or the wider public. Further, the 
leadership of these individuals influenced the aims and means adopted by the ICC, 
grounding its authority in moral terms and focusing on the court’s potential to 
transform international politics.55 Their emphasis on the independence of the court 
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and its potential to undermine traditional notions of sovereignty, however, challenges 
the authority of the states that the court depends on practically to do its business. 
These influential individuals, however, were hardly operating in a vacuum. An 
international criminal court had first been on the UN agenda in 1948, at the time of 
the passage of the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Right, when the plan for such a court was first referred to the ILC for consideration.56 
The ILC helped to develop the legal thinking that went into the ICC57 and kept the 
hope for a court alive while it was a political impossibility.58 Additionally, the GA’s 
support was influential, particularly in insulating the court from the interests of the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).59 So, even while the 
initiation of the drafting process was left up to the effort of dedicated individuals, the 
UN provided an institutional space in which the court was seen as a way to fulfill the 
organizations mission of protecting human rights while ensuring international peace 
and security.  
The sense of urgency and possibility around the drafting of the ICC had 
something to do with events at the UN. As the organization’s activities expanded with 
the end of the Cold War and it was called upon to respond to humanitarian crisis and 
human rights abuses, the need for a permanent court increased.60 This should not, 
however, be taken to show that the UN’s actions were purely moral—particularly 
among UNSC members, part of the appeal of a permanent international court was that 
it would ease the burden of responding to international crises in an ad hoc way, both 
by building up a reliable infrastructure and passing some of the responsibility to a 
new institution.61 The UN’s role reveals another important tension at the heart of the 
ICC: Although there was a real commitment to the development of international 
criminal law, there was also a political goal of transferring responsibility, as much as 
authority, to an institution with potentially very little power to effectively enforce the 
law. 
Perhaps the most surprising feature of the drafting of the ICC was that so 
many states were supportive. This support, however, was characterized by important 
tensions. There were a number of states that were committed to the idea of a 
permanent and independent court. Eventually becoming known as the like-minded 
group (LMG), the states involved expanded throughout the drafting process and 
supported the court in hopes of building the rule of law internationally, spurred on by 
atrocities seen in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as a sense of completing 
the institutional protection for human rights originally envisioned in 1948.62 Within 
the LMG there was important variation. The group included European states long 
committed to the development of international law(such as the Netherlands and 
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Germany)states from the global south keen to support a court they hoped would be 
independent from the UNSC and the influence of powerful states (especially in South 
America and Africa), and states more recently convinced of  the need for an 
international court (such as the United Kingdom, which joined late in the process on 
the back of the developing consensus and changes in domestic leadership).63 These 
states cooperated with global civil society actors, fought to preserve the independence 
of the ICC from the UNSC, worked to establish the independence of the court’s 
prosecutor, and insisted on a wider jurisdiction than some would have preferred. 
Although the LMG proved that the court had support from states, many others 
were less supportive. Yet, despite their reticence, there were few serious attempts by 
powerful states to obstruct the drafting process. This is in part due to the political 
events at the time. High profile atrocities had made the issue of responding to such 
events an issue that was hard to ignore.64 The success of the ICC was partly due to 
circumstances. Its necessity and the moral imperative for reform were strengthened by 
events rather than the concentrated efforts of individuals or states. The lack of 
resistance was also political. In particular, the United States offered cautious support 
for the project, not wanting to appear callous in the face of atrocities, and also 
convinced that a permanent international court with limited powers could prove useful 
for states, providing a way of responding to events that made minimal demands.65 
Even countries that had never signed the Rome Statute (and still have not) like India, 
Russia and China involved themselves in the negotiations, seeking to shape rather 
than simply oppose the court.66 In the end, the political context of the ICC’s creation 
has engendered persistent tensions: First, there remain important inequalities between 
supportive states, particularly between European states who provide a good deal of 
the financial backing to the court and African states who are thus far the only states 
being investigated; Second , powerful states that are not party to the Rome Statute  
(especially the permanent members of the UNSC), continue to use the court for their 
own ends, which may have little to do with expanding the rule of law or seeking 
justice for victims of atrocity.67 
There was also a counterpressure coming from global civil society, which 
opposed the instrumentalization of the court by states. Operating under the CICC, 
civil society groups represented a wider concern than that of specific individuals or 
the UN. Supportive groups came to the drafting process with a number of concerns, 
though human rights advocacy and international law groups were dominant. What 
united them was a desire for a court independent of state control.68 Judging the impact 
of global civil society is complex, because although there is a consensus that the 
efforts of the CICC to provide information and advocacy were fundamental to the 
success of the Rome Statute, the ends of those involved were hardly homogenous.69 
Global civil society’s importance shows that the ICC was seen as a necessary 
institution by a relatively large number of people. This gives some credence to claims 
that the court represents the interests of humanity. However, such statements elide the 
partiality of the groups most involved, who tended to be from wealthy Western 
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countries and who can hardly be said to unequivocally or unproblematically speak on 
behalf of “humanity.”70  
There were many different reasons for supporting the creation of the ICC, 
such that the court was not a single response to a single problem. Yet as the statute of 
the ICC was drafted and the institution came into being, an account of the aims and 
means of the court was needed.71 Keeping the context of the process in mind, we can 
see that the stated aims of the court obscure as much as they reveal. The drafting 
process and the documents produced therein gave rise to rhetoric of common 
endeavor, which is laid out in the ends the court claims to serve. The extreme and 
pervasive violence of the twentieth century, enabled by a lawless international order 
and the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators, are designated as the problem the court is 
responding to, giving rise to its necessity. In order to respond to the violence and 
impunity of international politics, the ICC resolves to hold those most responsible for 
international crimes accountable to the international community, and in doing so 
bring justice to the victims and deter future violence.72 These are the ethical aims of 
the ICC, the ends to which it is dedicated in principle and practice. Importantly, these 
aims provide the deeper justification for the court’s authority, beyond the agreement 
of the states that signed the Rome Statute.  
The means for achieving these ends are set out in the ICC’s founding 
document, which is focused on the need to extend the rule of law to the international 
level and to punish those responsible for atrocities. These intertwined projects of 
improving the procedures of international criminal law, moving away from “victor’s 
justice,” and punishing responsible individuals, were seen as vital to achieving the 
court’s aims.73 Central to this work is maintaining the separation of law from politics, 
because the court’s means of achieving its ends are premised on the neutrality and 
fairness of the legal process as well as the justness of the punishments imposed. While 
the aims and means of the court fit well together in official statements, there are real 
problems with the details of its practice.  
The ICC claims to promote the rule of law by being a court of last resort, 
stepping in when states are unable or unwilling to prosecute crimes of international 
concern, but this much-discussed principle of complementarity says little about the 
standards that must be met by domestic prosecutions to pass the threshold of being 
able to prosecute crimes.74 This creates a problem because nearly any minimally legal 
proceeding would seem to circumvent the ICC’s jurisdiction, making it very difficult 
for the ICC to pursue cases where states are unwilling to prosecute cases in a 
thorough and rigorous way, especially if those states are powerful.75 Further, by not 
having a clear measure of competency, the ICC is open to manipulation by states that 
invoke the ICC’s jurisdiction for their own political gain rather than any real inability 
to conduct a domestic trial. For weaker states the ICC can provide legitimacy to the 
government and improve the state’s ability to gain assistance from other states and 
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international institutions as working with the ICC can be used to show concern for 
international law and a willingness to follow international norms.76 
Within the idea of complementarity we find one of the big difficulties the ICC 
faces: its authority is drawn from its ability to enforce the rule of law upon state 
representatives, but the practice of the court protects the power of states. The idea of 
complementarity leaves the meaning and quality of domestic law to states at the same 
time that the court claims to be the embodiment of a universal law.77 A successful 
court, short of being one with no cases (as Ocampo famously said),78 is one whose 
authority is not coercive, such that states either try cases domestically or willingly 
submit cases to the ICC via referrals from state parties or the UNSC. In practice, even 
the court’s self referrals depend upon cooperation, either of the state under 
investigation, or of states powerful enough to force the offending state to comply. One 
could accept this limitation more sanguinely if the court were dedicated to improving 
the quality of domestic courts and building the capacity of states to uphold the rule of 
law—even though in this case the ICC would look less like an independent 
international court and more like a conventional international institution focused on 
capacity building.  
The issue of punishment is also troubling because its justification is unclear and its 
effectiveness is hard to confirm. If the point of punishment is deterrence, then the ICC 
is undermined by its dependence on states to enforce its arrest warrants. (It has no 
independent power in such matters, a point made clear when President Omar al-
Bashir travelled to Chad79 and Kenya80—both parties to the ICC—without incident.) 
Further, the evidence that the threat of prosecution can deter international crime is 
questionable. It is not clear how the threat of prosecution is effectively communicated 
and whether it changes the calculations of those committing atrocities in contexts of 
mass violence.81 Other justifications for punishment are likewise problematic The 
sentences the court is able to hand out may not be appropriately retributive for the 
crimes it pursues, if any prison sentence could be for acts of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.82 The ICC’s first conviction tells the story. Thomas 
Lubanga was convicted for war crimes relating to the use of child soldiers in his 
militia, but was sentenced to only fourteen years with time served, meaning he will be 
free in 8 years.83 In such a case it is hard not to feel that Ocampo has oversold his 
accomplishment when he says, “An international court investigated the suffering of 
some of the most vulnerable members of humanity - children in war zones . . . . The 
court provided a fair trial to the suspect and convicted him. It is a victory for 
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humanity.”84 Ocampo’s comments also highlight the difficulty of knowing for whom 
the ICC prosecutes. Punishment is meted out in an international space and to 
international standards, severing the link between punishment and the society and 
individuals affected. However much we may want to put convictions in context and 
see it as one step in a larger process, the victory for humanity and for those affected 
by violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo is modest.  
The aim of holding the perpetrators of atrocity to account is obviously 
appealing, but again the ICC runs into serious practical problems on this point. 
Although the court claims political independence, it not only is dependent upon the 
willingness of states to apprehend suspects but also is pursuing a political project of 
its own that may have very little to do with the victims affected by violence. The issue 
of punishment highlights this point: When the ICC is operating effectively it should 
remove an individual suspect from the society in which his alleged crimes are 
committed, taking him to The Hague to stand trial before an international panel of 
judges and, if convicted, sentencing him according to international standards, and 
holding him in custody in a foreign country. Whatever one thinks of the merits of this 
project, the court does not adequately acknowledge its politics on this point. The 
implicit idea is that the international community, referred to in the abstract as 
“humanity”, has priority in seeking punishment and in finding justice.85 Further, by 
focusing on the acts of individuals the ICC presents a very limited view of the causes 
of conflict, one that also happens to excuse systemic causes and the influences of 
outside institutions and states. We need not attribute malicious motives to the court’s 
political project for this to be problematic. The ICC’s project is played out in an 
existing context in which powerful states are able to influence the court’s actions, 
which suggests that there are deep reasons why it has tended to focus on weak African 
countries, lending credence to the complaint that the ICC is a court for European 
states to put African leaders on trial.86 This is a disturbing possibility given the stated 
aims of the ICC. 
The concerns discussed thus far regarding the constitution of the ICC’s 
authority to hold individuals responsible have been conceptual, looking at how the 
competing motivations that led to the creation of the court and the way in which its 
stated aims and means create problems for the court in practice. Following a Deweyan 
line of analysis, it is important to look at the consequences of the ICC’s practical 
activity to judge how far the concerns raised thus far have proven warranted, as well 
as to consider ways in which the moral ends and practices of the court might be 
reconstructed. To do this fully would require far more space than is available here, so 
I focus on the ICC’s first arrest warrants, issued for Joseph Kony and other leaders of 
the LRA to give some indication of the moral issues the ICC faces.  
The key issue I want to focus on is how the authority of the ICC is premised 
on its abdication of politics—refusing to admit its political power and role—and 
claiming of authority through the nonpolitical moral and legal ends pursued. Yet 
politics is central to the court’s actions; it must choose who to prosecute, draw 
distinctions between worthy victims, and distinguish the most culpable perpetrators. 
The court will inevitably make compromises and exert its power in potentially violent 
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ways, and it must also seek favor with other interested actors, such as the United 
States or the UNSC. Therefore, the ICC’s disavowal of politics is potentially limiting. 
The ICC risks being ineffective and manipulated by other political actors if it is naïve 
on these matters.  More importantly, the courts failure to recognize or acknowledge its 
own political power means that the depoliticization brought about by its appeal to 
moral and legal authority is obscured, potentially hiding negative consequences such 
as the court’s tendency to disempower victims and act as a judicial institution of the 
strong to be used against the weak. These issues are explored in more depth with 
regards to the ICC’s actions in Uganda. 
 
IV 
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY: UGANDA AND THE ICC 
Given the importance of appearing to uphold the neutrality of the law and the 
universality of its moral ends, the ICC faced more difficulty than a normal court in 
choosing its first cases. The first case the court pursued was going to be a test for the 
new institution. It would be a response to questions of whether the ICC could function 
independently and whether new forms of international justice were possible. In the 
end, the ICC had a number of cases to choose from as states began to refer cases to 
the court very quickly.87 This act of choosing was the first exercise of the court’s 
political as well as moral and legal authority. At first glance, the referral of the LRA 
from the Ugandan government to the ICC seemed an obvious choice. The Ugandan 
government was supportive of the investigation, the United States was not going to 
block the referral despite its assistance to Uganda, and the persons accused were 
notorious for the brutality in the long-running Ugandan civil war.88 Joseph Kony 
made an excellent target for prosecution, his atrocities were shocking and well 
known, and he was unquestionably the most important leader in the LRA. Therefore, 
Uganda fit the ends of the court quite well. Court officials hoped that bringing top 
LRA leaders to justice not only would punish these criminals and deter future 
violence from rebel groups in the country, but also would contribute to the peace 
process and providing a sense of closure for the LRA’s victims.89 Being able to frame 
their first case in these terms allowed the court, and its prosecutor, to act on the 
declared ends of the court without offering much reason for concern regarding the 
possibility of unexpected negative consequences.  
What this focus on the ideal qualities of the Uganda case obscures is that this 
was also a decision that was deeply political. The ICC could have started elsewhere 
and they could have handled the proceedings differently. It is a common refrain from 
the ICC that their choice of cases are dictated by the interests of justice, not political 
calculations about what is best for the court, but that plea is unconvincing.90 The ICC 
makes important decisions about whether a case is sufficiently grave to warrant their 
intervention and distinguishes between perpetrators who are more or less responsible, 
meaning the court must make decisions about the nature of the atrocities being 
committed and their cause. There are no clear guidelines on how these decisions are 
made and little record of the reasoning used by the prosecutor. Also, the decisions the 
ICC makes have consequences on those most directly affected by the events they are 
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investigating, but the court prioritizes prosecution (in the name of justice) over 
concerns about peace and reconciliation, or relief for victims, despite having 
discretion on these matters in principle.91 These problems are not fatal to the court’s 
worth, or its moral quality. The legal process itself can address them to some degree, 
which will be seen in what follows. The central point, however, is that the court is a 
political actor, it makes distinctions and wields power that not only go beyond the law 
but also reveal that the appeal to law and morality is itself political. 
In publically denying its political power and the importance of political 
calculations to its work, the ICC risks complicity with the very state authority it 
claims to constrain. This complicity is evidenced by Ocampo’s appearance with 
Ugandan President Museveni in London in January 2004 for the announcement of the 
ICC’s investigation in Uganda.92 That moment conveyed the message that the ICC 
would not be investigating the government for potential crimes, despite accusations 
that the army had committed atrocities in northern Uganda and that the Ugandan 
government had supported rebel groups operating in the DRC. The court’s defense 
has been that it is focused on the most serious crimes, but again how this is 
determined is not known and the pressures to work closely with the Ugandan 
government are substantial.93 First, the court is dependent upon the government for 
access to Uganda, without which investigations would have been impossible. Also, 
the court needs state support if it hopes to apprehend Kony and the other suspects; this 
effort has required cooperation from the Ugandan military. Beyond these practical 
reasons for cooperating with the government there is also the political message to be 
communicated that the ICC is not a threat to its supporters, reassuring them that 
bringing a case to the ICC will not result in the referring state finding itself under 
investigation. In Uganda we can see how this was good for both the government and 
the court: the ICC got its first case, helping it to establish its legitimacy, while the 
Ugandan government received international legitimacy and assistance in defeating its 
political opponents. 
In terms of pursuing its stated moral aims, the ICC’s complicity with the 
Ugandan government is troubling because the court’s moral authority is based on its 
claim to end impunity and serve the interests of victims, both of which are 
compromised. It was originally thought that self referrals would be rare at the ICC,94 
because it was assumed that states would not want to allow an international court to 
try their nationals, much less to potentially investigate their government. But this 
assumption only holds if the court does not compromise and maintains the separation 
of law and politics. The court’s compromise and corresponding failure to attend to 
government atrocities in Uganda suggests that the court serves the interest of the 
government and of itself, not the interest in the rule of law or in the needs of victims. 
The rule of law is compromised because it is applied unequally (to the LRA leaders 
but not the government troops) and the needs of victims are compromised because the 
ends of legitimizing the ICC and securing the Ugandan government against its 
enemies are prioritized over putting an end to violence or taking care of the victims. 
Part of the problem in this instance is that the ICC has seemed unprepared for the 
political purposes that states would seek to serve by engaging with the court, which 
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suggests that they have been naïve in not anticipating the political benefit states would 
find in bringing cases to the ICC. Uganda’s government was able to garner military 
assistance, curry international favor, and marginalize its enemies by using the moral 
authority of the ICC The court has seemed either unwilling to recognize or unwilling 
to accept this conclusion.95  
The problem, however, goes deeper. The court is set up in such a way that if it 
were to act against the interests of states, it would struggle to be effective. Despite the 
moral justifications for the court’s authority, which speak of a law that transcends 
state sovereignty, the court is thoroughly deferential to states. The principle of 
complementarity gives the first right and responsibility of prosecution to states,96 and 
the focus on individuals diverts attention away from institutional and social causes of 
violence.97 This reflects a wider failure of the idea of international justice that the 
court is poised to deliver. First, as was the case in Uganda, the ICC’s involvement has 
ambiguous consequences for the victims of violence. The people of northern Uganda, 
especially the Acholi, suffered most in Uganda’s civil war but their interest and needs 
were not well served by the ICC.98 It is unclear that ICC prosecutions did much for 
them as it arguably made the violence in the region worse rather than better by 
discouraging LRA militias from agreeing a peace deal. Second, it is not at all clear 
that having figures like Kony stand trial in The Hague serves their interest in seeing 
justice done. Third, the lack of attention to the government’s actions and the 
complicity of international institutions that have funded the displacement camps, have 
meant that the underlying conditions that led to violence in Uganda have not been 
addressed.99 
Instead the authority of the state is reaffirmed and the interests of the 
international community are given priority. First, ICC involvement brands the LRA 
leaders as criminals, thereby encouraging and justifying the use of further violence to 
bring those leaders to justice. Second, ICC involvement promotes the conception of 
justice as international accountability rather than local justice for those most affected, 
or peace for that matter.  Put another way, the ICC uses its moral and legal authority 
to pursue a vision of justice that is seen as superior to that sought by those affected.100 
The ICC imports moral norms and models of legal efficiency that do seek the 
participation or knowledge of those involved but presume the superiority of 
international justice, which is itself made possible by powerful states. This dynamic 
risks perpetuating colonial modes of domination. The focus on international justice 
and building the capacity of the state tends to not only disempower victims, who are 
seen as passive, but also to portray the LRA as composed of irrational savages and 
criminals without legitimate grievances.101 Further, even as the ICC has privileged the 
Ugandan state, its modes of intervention undermine democratic authority in the 
country by playing into preexisting dynamics of aid-dependency, economic and 
military intervention from international community, and the necessity of forms of 
external governance.  
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This brief consideration of the ICC’s intervention in Uganda shows that there 
are serious unintended consequences of the court’s pursuit of its moral ends. There is 
definitely some room for improvement as the court becomes more adept in its work. 
For example, the naïveté  shown by too readily embracing the Ugandan government is 
relatively simple to overcome by being more attentive to the benefits that states may 
be seeking in referring a case to the ICC.  
However, there are also more serious problems with the ICC’s pursuit of 
moral ends.  At least in Uganda, the court has been shown in Uganda to be too 
deferential to the interests of states and too inattentive to the victims of violence. This 
is a damning indictment because it undermines the aims and authority of the court. 
There are many ways we can seek to address this problem, but I want to focus again 
on the ICC’s denial of political motivations as a key cause, because this denial is 
contradictory. The court wields political power and must make political decisions to 
achieve its ends, which are not necessarily given in a singular or comprehensive way 
by the court’s founding texts. If this is correct, then the court needs to acknowledge 
the power it has and articulate its ends as a political as well as a moral and legal 
project.  
 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Considering how the ICC claims and exercises its authority to hold individuals 
responsible reveals important limitations upon the court’s capacity as a moral actor. 
Most importantly, the court’s moral authority is premised on the distance it maintains 
from politics by focusing on the impartial application of the law in the name of 
universal principles, but this distance is undermined in practice. The court’s inability 
to maintain an apolitical stance is not simply the product of inevitable practical 
compromise. Rather, this inability reveals important problems with how the ICC 
claims moral authority. First, the ICC like all social institutions pursuing moral ends 
is complex and embodies multiple ends and divergent projects. Claiming to have a 
clear moral purpose supported by a wide consensus does the ICC no favors, because 
the practical reality is that its actions will be inconsistent at times and that pursuing 
international justice through high profile trials of individual perpetrators is a political 
project in its own right. Second, the ICC’s claim to represent humanity in its pursuit 
of international justice obscures the partiality of the project. Ideals of humanity and 
justice are defined in particular ways that reflect important power inequalities. The 
ICC serves many interests through such claims, partly as a counterhegemonic 
institution that nonhegemonic states have used as a way to bolster their ethical status 
with respect to hegemonic states like the United States, Russia and China. Also, the 
ICC serves the interests of powerful states by providing further justifications for 
intervention in the global south, particularly in African states. Yet this dynamic is 
exploited by weaker states, which are able to use international attention and support 
for their own purposes. Third and finally, the ICC’s apolitical stance obscures the fact 
that the interests of an international court are not necessarily the same as those of the 
victims of violence that the court claims to represent. This is the most morally 
troubling limitation of the court because it reflects not only the reality that moral aims 
are always pursued in the real world but also that there may be something 
fundamentally troubling in the ends the court is seeking to realize. 
International justice as an ideal presumes that there are principles and ends 
that are universally desirable, and that the realization of those principles and ends 
requires forms of global authority. This framing will always leave open the possibility 
that the powerful dictate to the weak, and the justifications of law and morality cannot 
alter this, which is why the political mechanisms through which international justice 
is realized are vital. If international justice is actually going to be about preventing 
future violence and serving the needs of victims, then it needs to find a way to provide 
an international level of protection and action that includes the knowledge, values and 
needs of those affected by violence. This is the primary critique that a Deweyan 
analysis leads us to, that the ICC for all its potential, does not enable those subject to 
violence to exert greater control over their lives, and it does not effectively build 
social relationships that reduce the possibility of extreme violence. This happens 
because the court has oriented itself around high-profile prosecutions of individuals 
and has cooperated closely with states. There are real practical reasons this is 
important for the survival of the ICC as an institution, but acknowledging the political 
compromises involved reveals how this undermines the court’s stated ends. On this 
point there is much the court could do by reorienting its practice – challenging states 
that refer cases more directly, being concerned with wider conditions that enable 
violence, and being more aware of how states seek to use the court to their benefit. 
More problematic, however, is that the court’s vision of worldwide authority is itself 
undemocratic and is as much about securing the moral and legal authority of 
centralized global forms of power as it is about empowering communities and 
individuals affected by violence. This limitation is much more difficult to overcome, 
as it is less an unintended consequence of the court’s actions and more a consequence 
of the political project that lies behind its stated moral aims. There is not sufficient 
space here to consider how the court might be remade to meet this objection, 
especially as it would have to consider the wider ethos that motivates international 
criminal law as a project. For now, thinking about the undemocratic nature of the ICC 
both in principle and practice should give us pause when celebrating the achievements 
of the court, forcing us to ask the question, who is served by such trials and 
investigations, and what good comes of them. I do not want to suggest that the ICC 
cannot or has not done important work, but rather that there is a limitation built into 
how the court conceives of itself as an actor with the authority to hold others 
accountable, and that we should hold the court itself accountable to standards that are 
focused on the wishes, ideas and needs of those who suffer rather than the powerful 
interests that normally define international justice as an ideal. 
